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Abstract
In this paper a difficult question is answered with a surprisingly simple an-
swer. A monopolist who possesses nested information can earn money from
selling it at different levels of precision to investors. The problem is to max-
imize profits by choosing the optimal distribution of information among the
investors. I show that, the optimal distribution is to give all informed in-
vestors the same level of precision. The model belying this result is a con-
tinuous version of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980).
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Say you are an insider and you are willing to commit the crime of selling
information to some investors for a handsome sum. The sources of informa-
tion for investors are only official accounts and yourself, so for really precise
information you are an information monopolist. Then, how should you dis-
tribute more precise and less precise information among investors in order to
maximize your profit? This paper investigates this question, and the answer
turns out to be very simple; there will be no discriminatory distribution of
information among informed investors at all! The profit maximizing strategy
for an information monopolist is to supply the same information to every
informed investor.
What this paper does is therefore to ask a very complicated question,
and provide a surprisingly simple answer. The information monopolist will
be allowed to distribute information according to any partially continuous
density function over a continuum of investos at no extra "discrimination
cost". Even then, the simplest, and probably cheapest, way of distributing
information is the optimal one.
The fraction of informed investors will depend on the level of noise trad-
ing, quality of the information sold and volatility of the asset. If there is
much noise in the prices (high level of noise traders) and the unconditional
variance of the traded stock relatively low it will be optimal to supply a
relatively large amount of information. This is because a high level of noise
relative to unconditional variance describes an opaque market where infor-
mation is not easily transferred to those not paying for it. Distributing more
information thus has a less negative effect on monopolist profits in terms of
making the prices more informative.
If the unconditional variance of the asset is high the monopolist will
inform a relatively large mass of investors. This is because the monopolist
has to balance the number of non-paying uninformed investors to those who
receive information and pay. The higher the unconditional variance, the more
investors will gain by buying information, and so the more the monopolist
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earns per informed investor. This therefore leads to a higher fraction of
investors being informed when the unconditional variance is high.
Since the monopolist does not sell all of his information, there is a kind of
information "dead weight loss" where useful information is never disclosed.
There will be information that investors would be willing to pay for, but
releasing it would deplete the value of the information sold.
The example of the insider serves as an instructive illustration of the issues
discussed in this paper. The results are however applicable for other issues,
such as analysts’ incentives to do research and the quality of information that
is possible to obtain in an information market. This paper can also be useful
for understanding how information is treated in general. The main point of
the financial market approach is that the more who have the information the
less value it has, but this may be the case for other types of information.
The extent to which this model relates to real insider trading may however
also be used by regulators to deal with this particular problem.
In addition one may look at the monopolist as an abstraction used to
evaluate the value of information in a market. Within this perspective, the
model presented here will also give some insight into how distribution of
information in general affects its value.
In this paper the information is nested. That is the information differs
between agents in a way such that a well-informed trader has all the infor-
mation of the less informed, and some more. The effect of this is that the
covariance between two signals equals the variance of the more precise signal.
The motivation for a nested information structure is that it is a likely struc-
ture for information sold by a monopolist. A non-nested structure would
resemble an insider who sells different pages to different investors from un-
published account books. A nested model can be illustrated as the insider
in addition provides all preceding pages to the buyer as well. In a discus-
sion about the distribution of information, a nested model therefore seems
more appropriate than a model with independent information units sold to
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different investors.
It is assumed that the monopolist cannot trade himself. There might
be different reasons for this, such as legal issues or constraints on liquidity.
Other authors have assumed a trading monopolist such as Admati and Pflei-
derer (1988) (AP). This does, however, seem to be possible only with strict
assumptions on the price setting mechanism. AP use a price setting mecha-
nism of Kyle (1985) where the price is set so that uninformed investors have
no incentive to trade at all. Kyle assumes the price is set by a risk neutral
market maker, equal to his expectation. This has the implication that the
monopolist need not concern himself with the effect seen in Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980) (GS), where information sold is partially transferred to unin-
formed investors through prices, reducing its value. It is therefore reasonable
that without this indirect effect on the value of information seen in GS, it
might actually be beneficial for a trading monopolist to sell information.
In the framework of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) there is no market
maker and all agents are risk averse. The GS model does not seem to permit
an information monopolist that can trade freely. The value of information in
the GS model is the same for everyone, and so there should be no incentive
to sell it for a trader. In this paper, prices are set competitively as in GS
and so it is just assumed that the monopolist is unable to profit directly by
the information. Thus, the entire profit of the monopolist is due to resale
of information to traders. The conclusion of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988)
is that the monopolist may not sell information to all traders, as is also the
case in this paper.
Admati and Pfleiderer (1990) assume personalized noise, and compare (in
a GS competitive model) the direct sale of information and sale through a
mutual fund. It is found that if the monopolist can choose an asset pricing
function as well as a fixed fee (a two part pricing scheme) then he will always
prefer to sell information through the fund.
Verrecchia (1982) lets investors be able to choose a certain level of pre-
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cision of signals, where the signal disturbance is independently distributed
among investors. The level of precision is set equal for investors with the
same level of risk aversion. The usual properties for the cost function are
assumed. Thus given a cost function, investors demand a certain amount of
information. Investors demand different levels of information because they
have different risk aversions. Investors with higher risk aversion demand less
information. Furthermore, demand for information is lower when the price
signal has high precision.
As a rational expectation model with an endogenous state variable one
unavoidably has to deal with the problem of "infinite regress". When agents’
behavior affects variables, that determine the same agents’ strategies, an
initially simple model can easily become so complicated that it prevents a
solution. Sargent (1991) proposed a general method to deal with this. In the
model of Sargent, investors are uncertain about the real stochastic process of
all state variables, but observe a subset of these. As time passes agents learn
from these observations and in equilibrium, their "perceived law of motion"
will correspond to the actual one. The method of Sargent is widely used, for
example in the business cycle model of Townsend (1983) and the financial
model of Zhou (1998) who considers specialized investors.
A different approach to the problem of infinite regress is however taken
here. In this model, information is continuous and nested so that investors
only condition on demand generated by more informed investors. Thus, the
equilibrium condition is a differential equation. The solution to this equation
then determines the moments of the price and signals. Based on this, profits
for the monopolist can be computed.
Although there seems to be little theoretical work on nested information
in financial markets, Dupont (1997) assumes correlated signals between in-
vestors with varying precision, similar to a nested structure. The approach
taken here is to assume that such correlations arise specifically by a nested
structure on information where the covariance between two signals is the
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variance of the one with the best precision.
The paper is organized as follows. In the first section, the nested infor-
mation structure is defined and the formation of expectations is presented.
In the section II we assume that the information monopolist can only dis-
criminate between informed and uninformed investors. The resulting profit
maximizing amount of precision, and number of informed investors consistent
with a rational expectations Nash equilibrium is then found.
We then allow in section three for infinitely many investors, and derive
their competitive strategies.
In section four it is shown that the best the monopolist can do is to
distribute the same level of precision to all informed investors.
Results are then discussed in the final concluding section.
I Continuous information distribution
Let there be a risk free asset which yields a zero rate of return and a risky
asset which returns θ in the next period. The risky return is stochastic, but








θ is however not directly observable by investors. Instead investors can
draw continuous independent information increments dut from a related dis-
tribution, in order to learn about θ. The amount of information an investor
possesses is a fraction t of full information and is bought at cost ct. t is
proportional to the precision of the stochastic process
U =
©





, t ∈ (0, 1] (2)










(2) is a continuous version of the process of sampling an increasing number
of discrete observations from a distribution related to θ. In particular it is
the case that var (ut) = 1tσ
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property of the information ut is what makes this a nested information model.
The covariance between two different signals is the same as the variance of the
most precise signal. Thus, a more informed investor has all the information
of less informed investors, but then some extra, which reduces variance.
The information level t is restricted to be in the unit interval. This gives
σ2ε the interpretation of the smallest possible variance that the monopolist
can offer investors.
A. Expectation of the asset return
Less informed investors may observe a price signal P in the market as a result
of demand from all investors. This price signal will carry information from
more informed investors. However, if investors are asymmetrically informed,
they will not use the price signal as observed, but rather a refined version
of it, Pt, for the following reason. For an investor with positive information
t part of the information contained in the price is superfluous. The price
is generated partly by the process up to t, that is ut. The investor does
however know ut, which of course unlike the price is a precise measure of ut.
Just using P as observed is therefore a very naive approach since it brings in
imprecise information which could potentially be filtered out. The investor
will therefore filter the price observation so that it only depends on the part
of the process U which is not known to him. Denote this filtered price with
respect to information t as Pt. The exact way to make such adjustments will
be presented later.
Due to normality of the stochastic variables, the conditional expectation
6
is based on a linear relationship:
θ = µθ + βu,t (ut − µθ) + βP,t (Pt − µθ) + κt (4)
κt being independently normally distributed. The conditional expectation
is then E (θ| t, Pt) = θ−κt. For rational expectations the parameters βu,t and
βP,t must be set so that κt is independent of the regressors (the signal ut and
the price measure Pt). This will give us two equations per investor type which
in principle can be used to solve for the variance of Pt and its covariance with
θ, and thereby determining the market equilibrium. In practice however, an
explicit solution becomes close to impossible to find for just a few different
levels of investors.
II Optimal distribution of information with
two levels of information
Agents have a CARA utility and the same initial wealth. The choice for an
investor with information t between holding the amount Xt of the risky asset,
and investing Mt in a risky asset is thus subject to the budget constraint
W0 = XtP +Mt (5)
As in GS, we use the well-known fact that with one risky asset the demand
of a CARA investor will be the ratio of discounted expected return to the
variance and the CARA-coefficient. The absolute risk aversion and risk free
return are however set to unity here, as they play no role in what will be








Let there be λ informed traders and 1− λ uninformed traders. The market
is in equilibrium whenever
(1− λ) E (θ|P )− P
var (θ|P ) + λ
E (θ|µt)− P
var (θ|µt)
+ η = 0 (7)
holds. η is the stochastic net demand (noise traders). The price P that
solves this is the equilibrium price.
The informed investors will disregard the price information of course, be-
cause it does not contain any new information for them. The uninformed will
use the observed price P , but have no signal to condition on. For informed








, βP,t = 0 (8)


















where σθP is the covariance between the equilibrium price and the asset
return. σ2P is the price variance.
From (7) we can find an expression for P. Similar to Grossman and Stiglitz
(1980) we can use this to find expressions for σθP and σ2P , giving us two
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equations to solve these two unknowns. Doing this it can be found that
























B. The profit function
The question now is how may the monopolist profit as much as possible by
selling an amount of information t to some fraction λ of the traders. Since
the monopolist earns zero from the uninformed, his problem is first to charge
as much as possible for the information sold. Second he must maximize
total revenue by choosing an amount t to sell, and a fraction of investors
λ to sell to. When the utility from holding zero information and holding
information t is the same, the maximum amount charged for the information
is reached. That is, the cost of information consistent with monopolist profit
maximization must be such that the utility for an informed investor is the
same as that for an uninformed.
A CARA investor with absolute risk aversion equal to one who has bought
information t at cost ct and demands Xt of the risky asset, has utility after
realizations of θ and ut of
Vt = − exp [− ((W0 − ct) +Xt (θ − P ))]
After being informed the expected utility is









Prior to being informed ut is however unknown and so (13) is stochastic
when the choice of information level is made. E (θ|ut, Pt) − P is normally
distributed with a known expectation and variance and so E (Vt) can be found
by taking the apropriate integral. It can be shown that (see Appendix A for
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details)
var (θ − P ) = var (θ|ut, Pt) + var (E (θ|ut, Pt)− P ) (14)
which implies that the expectation can be found to be
E (Vt) = − exp (− (W0 − ct)) SD(θ|ut,Pt)SD(θ−P ) (15)
The above expression has a very heuristic interpretation. The fraction on
the right hand side is the amount of standard deviation in expected profit
that the model (4) cannot explain. Say the investor by use of the model (4)
can fully predict returns, that is SD (θ|ut, Pt) = 0. If it now was possible
for prices (public information) not to track this prediction perfectly in this
situation, we would have SD (θ − P ) > 0 and expected utility equals zero,
corresponding to an infinite level of utility.
As mentioned the best the monopolist can do is to charge an amount such
that investors are indifferent between buying zero an t information, that is










The monopolist charges this amount for a mass of λ investors. His total
profit is therefore λct.
C. Optimal mass and precision




where the dependence of ct on λ is apparent from the conditional variance
(12) and the definition of the profit function (16). As defined earlier in (2),
the best precision the monopolist can supply is defined to be 1. Now define
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If t has an internal solution, then1 q ≈ 0.65146. If the optimal information
level is t∗ = 1, then q depends ση, σθ and σε as observed in (18), but no
explicit solution exists. We can now state the following proposition
Proposition 1 If the monopolist can discriminate between informed and un-
informed investors only, he should optimally supply the amount of informa-








to the mass λ∗ = min (qσησθ, 1) of investors.
The proposition follows from the first order conditions. The profit func-
tion is not globally concave with respect to precision and mass, but ∂λct/∂t
is positive up to the internal solution for t and decreasing thereafter and so t∗
is unique. The uniqueness of λ∗ is a bit more tricky. One can however estab-
lish that at some positive point the profit λct becomes convex with respect
to λ and stays convex. Since limλ→∞ λct = 0 and λct > 0 for all finite λ, a λ
satisfying the first order condition gives the global maximum (see appendix
B for details).
The intuition behind this result is that if the monopolist only supplies a
small amount of information, the difference in precision levels will be very
small and thus so will the willingness to pay and the profit. Increasing
the amount of information will increase income at first, but it also makes
the market more transparent. In the extreme case where almost perfect
precision is supplied the price will almost perfectly reveal all information as
the informed investors will take very large positions. In this case there will
be no willingness to pay for information, and so there is a limit to the amount
of information the monopolist will sell.
The same argument can be used to explain how the number of informed
investors, λ, affect profits. If only a small number of investors are informed,
the volume sold is small and so is the income. If however a large fraction of
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investors are informed, it may reduce the value of the information because
more of it is revealed in the price. The optimal number of investors supplied
with information may therefore lie somewhere between zero and unity.










he is better off keeping it to himself. σ2ε is the residual variance of the best
information that the monopolist can supply. It is therefore the case that if the
information quality is poor, there is a high probability that the monopolist
should optimally supply all his information.
Interestingly the optimal amount of information is actually independent
of the level of noise trading when λ∗ is the internal solution. This is because
as the level of noise trading increases, the increase in number of informed
traders will exactly offset the positive effect of noise trading on the profit.





maximizes the profit of the monopolist. Thus if there is a lot of uncertainty
in the variance of the asset’s return, that is a high σθ, then the investor would
profit by selling relatively imprecise information to the market. If there is a
lot of disturbance to the market price through noise traders, a high ση, then
more precise information should be sold because the information value is less
degraded by the price signal.
III Optimal distribution of information with
infinitely many levels of information
We now turn to the more general case where the monopolist is able to dis-
criminate between an infinite number of investors. That is, the monopolist is
able to assign precision t to a density ft of investors at any level of precision.
In this setting, with a continuum of investors, the demand is an integral over
these investors. Thus the market equilibrium condition corresponding to (7)







dy + η = 0 (19)
η being random supply/demand from noise traders with expectation 0
for simplicity. Since investors know exactly the demand of less informed
investors (due to the nested information structure assumed), they will only
consider the demand generated by better-informed investors. This means
that for an investor with information t only, the part of the integral (19)
above t is of interest (it can be shown that this indeed yields a more efficient
estimate).
A. The price process
Solving for P in (19) and censoring the part of the integral with precision
less than t gives















fy/ var (θ|uy, Py) dy. (20) is a stochastic differential equa-
tion. Due to linearity however, we can treat it as an ordinary differential
equation. The general solution can be found by the standard formula for a
linear first order differential equation, and is
(Pt − µθ) = m−1t
µZ 1
t





















B. Joint moments of the price process and signals
We want to find the joint moments of the signals ut and the price measure




















We can now write the joint moments in terms of the above functions (for







































As previously mentioned the parameters βu,t and βP,t must be set so that































This implies the conditional variance (which in turn determines the will-
ingness to pay for information)














It is not possible to find an explicit expression of this variance, since the
function gt can only be found through numerical procedures with limited
accuracy.
C. The profit function
As in the previous section, investors with information t are willing to pay
an amount ct such that they are indifferent between any level of precision.
Although we are now considering an infinite number of investors, the function
ct largely remain the same as defined in (16), except that it will not depend
on λ but indirectly on the density function ft through the change in the
variables ay, by and γy. At a given level of information the monopolist earns



















which we note is independent of mt.
IV Solving for the optimal distribution of in-
formation
When solving for the optimal distribution of information, optimal control
theory will be used. Since we do not have an explicit expression for gt the
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solution will not rely on an explicit specification of the profit function.










using the density ft as the only control variable. The state at precision t
is described by the state variables at, bt and γt. We now state the following
proposition
Proposition 2 The distribution of information that maximizes overall in-
formation value Π is to have all informed investors concentrated at a single
level of precision t∗




























Denote the corresponding Hamilton function as Ht. Note here that the
derivative of all state variables are proportional to the control ft and that




= ht (at, bt, γt) (40)
for some function ht dependent on at, bt, γt and precision level only. Thus
∂Ht/∂ft is independent of the control ft, which is an important point when
proving Proposition 2. The monopolist will choose the density of investors





t − ft) ≥ 0 (41)
for all possible t and ft. Asterisks indicate values calculated with the
optimal control f∗t . We see that (39) is satisfied if f
∗
t = 0 whenever h
∗
t < 0
and f∗t set to its maximum value whenever h
∗
t ≥ 0.
Now denote by t∗ the smallest t where h∗t ≥ 0 is true. Let λ∆ be the length
of an interval I = [t∗, t∗ + λ∆], where λ ∈ [0, 1] is set such that h∗t ≥ 0∀t ∈ I.
A closed solution requires a maximum value for ft. We therefore assume







and so in the interval I the density of investors is set to ft = 1∆ by the
monopolist. This implies that the mass of informed investors in this interval
is λ.
Now two possibilities arise:
Conjecture 1 h∗t∗ ≥ 0 at t∗ +∆, that is λ = 1, meaning the total mass of
investors have been assigned information, and consequently this is the only
interval with a strictly positive density of investors.
Conjecture 2 h∗t < 0 for some t > t∗ + λ∆ and for λ ∈ [0, 1)
We now need to investigate if in case of Conjecture 2 there are any subse-
quent points at which h∗t ≥ 0 and f∗t > 0. We do this by noting the following
facts:
a) We see from the dynamic constraints (37) - (39) that at, bt and γt are
in fact constants when f∗t = 0.
b) The associated adjoint functions are constant too when f∗t = 0.
c) h∗t is continuous (due to continuity of the state variables, the definition
of ct and its independence of ft)
d) Statement c) and Conjecture 2 together implies that there must be
some t > t∗ + λ∆ for which h∗t < 0 and dh
∗
t/dt ≤ 0 holds simultaneously
arbitrarily close to t∗ + λ∆.
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f) With constant state variables and adjoint functions one can show that
if dh∗t/dt ≤ 0 and h∗t < 0 for some t̄, then h∗t < 0 also hold for any t ≥ t̄.
This is true because with constant variables as stated in a) and b), it is true
that dh∗t/dt = ∂h
∗
t/∂t. By evaluating this derivative one will find that the
sign of dh∗t/dt only changes to negative once.
Thus, we may conclude that I is the only interval in which f∗t > 0.
Allowing f∗t to approach infinity by letting ∆ → 0 implies that the interval
for which f∗t > 0 approaches a single point of mass λ ¥
Since it has been shown that it is optimal to concentrate the information
sale to a single level of precision, we can restate Proposition 1 in more general
terms
Proposition 3 A monopolist that can discriminate between an infinite num-









to a mass λ∗ = min (q∗σησθ, 1) of investors.
V Concluding remarks
This model shows that informing investors asymmetrically is never optimal.
When considering only homogenously informed investors it is found that a
well-informed information monopolist should sell less than all his information.
If there is a lot of noise, additional information has a less degrading effect
on its value, and so the monopolist can sell more information without loss.
The opposite is the case if the asset itself is very risky. In that case, less
information should be sold, because a smaller amount of information has
substantial value.
The findings in this paper show that an insider might consider holding
back information. Thus, there may be a natural limit to how much infor-
mation will be supplied by insiders in an asset market. Also, the insider
will actually prefer to supply market participants with the same information
even when distributing different information can be done at no extra cost
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and unlimited discrimination in terms of a continuous density function is
possible.
In practice, of course this may be difficult since the expected loss in being
caught is not taken into account in this model. It is however an interesting
idea that if a legal market was created for insider information, then it should
according to this model be distributed evenly and with low precision. For
example one might envision the creation of a market where firms supply
inside information to investors for a payment equal to the negative effect
that supplying this information may have on their profit due to revelation
of business strategies. This would increase transparency and thereby reduce
market risk, and also reduce incentives for criminal activity.
Since there is an upper limit to how precise the information sold in a
market will be, the model also suggests that analysts may limit the extent of
their research because very precise information may not be advantageous to
sell. This of course only holds as long as the analyst is actually able to obtain
monopoly on the information he gathers. The effect that not all information
will be sold also shows that there may be a "dead weight loss" in information
markets as well. The unsold information would of course make investors
better off by reducing variance, and they would be willing to pay for this.
However, since the monopolist controls the information flow, he can take into
account the negative effect that increased information in the market has on
the information value of the price.
Possible extensions of this model will for example be to let the monop-
olist do some limited trading. Also, it would be of interest to look at other
distributions of information not necessarily optimal for the monopolist. In
this way, one might obtain an understanding of how the value of information
is depleted by a heterogeneous distribution of it.
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1q = 0.651 460 502 417 619 437 in double precision.
VI Appendix
A. Unconditional variance of the profit
It will be proven that
var (θ − P ) = var (θ|ut, Pt) + var (E (θ|ut, Pt)− P ) (A.1)
First it must be shown that the residual of the regression (4) κt is uncor-
related with the price P . Recall (21):
(Pt − µθ)mt =
Z 1
t
gy (uy − µθ) dy + η (A.2)























gy (uy − µθ) dy (A.4)





= E(θ − µθ) P̃t −βu,t E (ut − µθ) P̃t (A.5)
−βP,t E (Pt − µθ) P̃t
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By the definition of ut in , and the definition of P̃t (A.4) it follows that









































because cov (ut, κt) = 0 (which is true because ut is a regressor). We can
thus conclude that cov (P, κt) = 0∀t.
Since E(θ|ut, Pt) = θ − κt we have
var (E (θ|ut, Pt)− P ) = var (θ − κt − P )
which we can write out as
var (E (θ|ut, Pt)− P ) = var (θ − κt) + 2 cov (κt, P )− 2σθ,P + σ2P
Using cov (κt, P ) = 0 and again that E (θ|ut, Pt) = θ − κt we can write
var (E (θ|ut, Pt)− P ) = var (E (θ|ut, Pt))− 2σθ,P + σ2P
Rearranging we get
var (E (θ|ut, Pt)− P ) =
¡




σ2θ − var (E (θ|ut, Pt))
¢
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The first term on the right and side equals var (θ − P ) and the second term
is var (θ|ut, Pt) ¥
B. Uniqueness of λ∗
The maximum of the profit function λct is given in Proposition 1, and we
want to be sure that this is a global maximum. The only positive real solution























It can be shown that ∂3ct/∂λ3 < 0, so the function starts concave and then
turns convex at λ = λ̂. Furthermore it can be shown that limλ→∞ λct = 0
and also it is a fact that λct > 0 for finite λ. This implies that in the convex
region λ > λ̂ of the profit function, the profit is always strictly decreasing,
since the profit is never negative. Of course λ is always less than unity, but
the point is that the first order condition can only hold in the concave region
of the profit function. Therefore if there exist a λ satisfying the first order
condition, this must in fact be the optimal λ maximizing the profit function
λct ¥
C. The moments of the price process
It will be shown how to derive the moments given in (25) - (29). From (21)
we have that
(Pt − µθ) = m−1t
µZ 1
t
gy (uy − µθ) dy + η
¶
(A.11)
The derivation of the moments builds on the fact that given the process
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of ut in (2) the variance of the signal process is
σ2ut = E(uy − µθ)




and the covariance between two signals of different precisions
σus,ut = E(us − µθ) (ut − µθ) = σ2θ + 1max(s,t)σ
2
ε (A.13)
because the innovation from s to t (or vice versa) is independent of the least
precise signal. The most precise signal is θ itself, and so
σut,θ = E(ut − µθ) (θ − µθ) = σ2θ (A.14)




















































































































D. h∗t has a single maximum if ft = 0
It will be proven that in intervals of t where the density ft is zero, there is a
single global maximum point of h∗t and more importantly, if h
∗
t < 0 for some
t = t̄, then this will be true also for t > t̄. This is important for the proof of
Proposition 2.







ht = ct (at, bt, γt) +
3X
i=1
pi,tψi (at, bt, γt, t) (A.19)
25
where the functions ψi are the right hand sides of the dynamic constraints
(37) - (39), divided by ft:













(at + γt (bt − tγt))σ2ε + σ2η
¢ (A.20)












(at + γt (bt − tγt))σ2ε + σ2η
¢ (A.21)

















(at + γt (bt − tγt))σ2ε + σ2η
¢ (A.22)
and ct (at, bt, γt) is found by inserting








into the cost function ct = 12 ln
varf (θ|u0,P0)
varf (θ|ut,Pt)
From the dynamic constraints (37) - (39) it follows that at, bt and γt are
constants if ft = 0. Furthermore, since Ht = 0 if ft = 0 it is also true that
∂Ht/∂at = ∂Ht/∂bt = ∂Ht/∂γt = 0. This in turn implies that if ft = 0 then





































ht is not globally concave in t but the sign of ∂ht/∂t depends on (−K + σ2θ varf (θ|ut, Pt)).
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Which means that if dht/dt < 0 and ft = 0 at t = t̄, then this is true
∀t > t̄ ¥
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